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I. INTRODUCTION
Although China has won many plaudits for its rapid transformation from an
autarky to theworld’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI)1 and
a regional export power-house, some economists –most notablyHuang (2003,
2004)– are less sanguine about the Chinese government’s long-standing policy
that encourages export-oriented FDI. Their main concern seems to be that
foreign ﬁrms, especially those in labour-intensive industries, divert exports
away from ﬁnancially-constrained indigenous private enterprises.
The Chinese banking system has a reputation of lending bias against private
ﬁrms (e.g. Allen et al. 2005). Until 1998, the four state-owned commercial
banks which dominate the banking system in China2 were instructed not to
lend toprivate enterprises.Huang (2003) contends that becauseof this ﬁnancial
repression, domestic private ﬁrms found it diﬃcult to engage in contractual
arrangementswith foreignbuyers3, creatinga fertile condition for foreignﬁrms
to extend equity ﬁnancing instead. According to this line of argument, a large
proportion of export-oriented FDI in China is due to the bias of the ﬁnancial
system that favours stagnant state-owned enterprises over more dynamic
private enterprises. As such, the huge ﬂow of FDI into the country should
not necessarily be an indicator of the strength of the economy.
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1. See ‘Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment’. OECD Directorate for
Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Aﬀairs. June 2004.
2. These four banks are the only ﬁnancial institutions that have branches in almost all locations in
China, andby2001 theyaccounted for nearly two thirds of loansoutstandinganddeposits (Boyreau-
Debray and Wei 2005).
3. For example, due to their inability to import machinery and equipment necessary to comply with an
export contract.
This criticism of export-oriented FDI in China motivates this paper. Two
research questions are addressed: (i) is there a link between access to ﬁnance
and ﬁrms’ exports? and (ii) what is the impact of FDI on the exporting
behaviour of indigenous enterprises?
The theoretical trade literature has examined the ﬁrst question from a
diﬀerent perspective. Within an augmented Heckscher-Ohlin model, Kletzer
and Bardhan (1987) oﬀer a theory which predicts that countries with well
functioning ﬁnancial systems tend to export goods produced in industries that
areheavilydependent on external ﬁnance.More recently,Chaney (2005) shows
that in the presence of ﬁxed costs associated with exporting, some ﬁrms do not
export because of liquidity constraints. The second question was ﬁrst explored
empirically by Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997) and their work has
spawned related ﬁrm level studies across a variety of countries. This paper
contributes to the literature bymodelling the interaction between ﬁnance, FDI
and individual ﬁrms’ exports in what is arguably the most important emerging
economy in the world.
The economic literature abounds with studies that examine the relation-
ship between aggregate growth and ﬁnance, but there is little research
relating to the speciﬁc mechanisms linking ﬁnance and growth, especially at
a micro level (see Levine 2005 for an extensive review)4. By focusing on ﬁrm
level exports, this paper also contribute to researchwhich sheds empirical light
on the various channels through which ﬁnancial development promotes
growth.
Our study draws on a rich panel data set of more than 28,000 domestic
private enterprises fromtheChinesemanufacturing sector, spanning theperiod
1999–2002. This is an interesting period as it coincides with China’s accession
to theWTOand the further opening of the economy to foreign investors. Four
key results emerge from the analysis: (i) Access to bank loans is associatedwith
greater export market orientation, especially amongst politically unaﬃliated
ﬁrms in labour-intensive industries; (ii) Export-oriented horizontal FDI has a
robust export enhancing eﬀect, and this eﬀect is more pronounced amongst
ﬁrms with more ﬁnance; (iii) Domestic market seeking horizontal FDI has
a deleterious eﬀect on the export market orientation of indigenous ﬁrms;
(iv) positive export spillovers throughvertical linkageswithmultinational ﬁrms
are few and far between.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II oﬀers a short
overview of the development of FDI in China. Section III discusses the
theoretical literature linking FDI, ﬁnance and exports. Section IV presents
the empirical model, and Section V describes the data and oﬀers some
4. Based on cross country growth regressions, Alfaro et al. (2004) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial development
speeds up the rate of FDI-induced economic growth rates.
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preliminary analysis. The main ﬁndings of the paper are discussed in Section
VI. Section VII concludes.
II. FOREIGN-INVESTED FIRMS IN CHINA
This sectionprovides a brief overviewof the trendofFDIﬂows intoChinaover
the past quarter of a century5. When the Chinese government initiated
economic reforms in the late 1970s, FDI was allowed only in designated
Special Economic Zones (SEZs)6, and foreign investors were required to have
local partners. At that time, FDI was seen by Chinese policy makers as an
important vehicle of its export-led and import substitution development
strategy. As a result, SEZs granted foreign investors concessionary tax policies
and exemption from export and import duties for equipment and machinery
employed in the production of export products.
Following thepassageof theWhollyForeign-OwnedEnterpriseLaw in1986,
ﬁrms with 100% foreign capital were allowed to operate in the country for the
ﬁrst time and by 1988 China’s Open Door Policy towards FDI extended to the
entire coastal zone. The main purpose of this policy initiative was to develop
labour-intensive industries that specialise in export processing of imported raw
materials. This export-oriented FDI policy has evidently been spectacularly
successful, asChina is nowdescribedas ‘the exportprocessing zoneof theworld’
(Lin 2002). The policy of further liberalisation of the economy initiated in 1992
witnessed a dramatic surge in multinational activity in China (see Figure 1).
Foreign investors were oﬀered better opportunities to sell their products in
the domestic market. As policy makers started to view FDI as a channel of
international knowledge transfer which would minimise the need for tech-
nology imports, high-tech investors were particularly encouraged.
FDI inChina is characterised byanuneven regional distribution.During the
period 1987–2000, about 87% of cumulative FDI was located in the coastal
regions (Wei 2003). This was mainly a reﬂection of the initial policy that
restrictedFDI tocoastal regions.Theproximityof those regions toHongKong
and Taiwan, the main sources of foreign investment, also contributed to these
geographical disparities. AlthoughWestern and Central regions are gradually
attracting more foreign investors, the skewed distribution of FDI in favour of
the coastal regions has raised serious concerns that FDI might exacerbate
existing regional inequalities (e.g. Bils 2005).
Investment from the Chinese Diaspora of Hong Kong, Taiwan andMacao
accounted for more than 60% of the total accumulated FDI stock in China
5. Some of the material in this section draws on Chen (1997) and Lemoine (2000).
6. The SEZs consisted of three in Guangdong Province: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen in
Fujian Province.
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between1983and1998 (OECD2000).This investment is predominantly export-
orientedand tends toconcentrate in labour-intensive sectors.During thisperiod,
multinationals from Japan, USA andWestern Europe represented 8.2%, 8.1%
and 6.7%of FDI, respectively. Foreign investment from theseOECDcountries
is predominantly in more capital-intensive sectors and is increasingly being
motivated by the desire for access to the huge domestic market.
Manufacturing enterprises inChina ﬁnance their investment from fourmain
sources: (i) state budgets; (ii) domestic bank loans, (iii) self-raised ﬁnance, such
as that obtained from domestic capital markets and retained earnings, and
(iv) foreignﬁnancing.A typical foreign-invested enterprise uses amixture of all
sources of ﬁnance listed above. Between 1999 and 2002, ﬁnance from state
budgets, domesticbank loans, self-raisedﬁnanceand foreign sourcesaccounted
for 8%,20%,17%,and55%respectivelyof the totalﬁnanceof foreign invested
ﬁrms in Chinese manufacturing7. These ﬁgures show that multinational ﬁrms
operating in China make signiﬁcant use of domestic ﬁnancial resources.
III. ACCESS TO FINANCE, EXPORTS AND FDI:
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1. Access to Finance and Exports
International trade theory suggests thatﬁnancial sectordevelopment isa source
of comparative advantage and consequently a determinant of international
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Figure 1
FDI ﬂows into China, 1979–2003
7. The ﬁgures are calculated based on the dataset used in this paper.
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trade ﬂows. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) extend the Heckscher-Ohlin trade
model by introducing a ﬁnancial sector and predict that a countrywith awell-
developed ﬁnancial sector will have comparative advantage in the export of
goods produced in industries that rely more on external ﬁnancing. Baldwin
(1989) develops a model in which ﬁnance is an instrument of risk diversiﬁca-
tion, and shows that ﬁrms in ﬁnancially developed countries enjoy better
opportunities for diversiﬁcation, and therefore specialise in the export of
risky goods8. Recently Chaney (2005) proposes a theory of international
trade which predicts that in the presence of sunk costs associated with
exporting, ﬁrms with liquidity constraints tend to be non-exporters.
Several channels through which ﬁnance generates growth are identiﬁed in the
theoretical literature. First, ﬁnancial intermediaries are deemed to be eﬀective at
picking entrepreneurs who aremore likely to engage in innovative activities. The
notion that ﬁnance plays a positive role in enhancing the rate of technological
innovation dates back to Schumpeter, and recent authorswhohave explored this
idea includeDe la Fuente andMarin (1996) andMorales (2003). Second, a well-
functioning ﬁnancial systemhas a positive inﬂuence onhuman capital accumula-
tion.Forexample, Jacoby (1994) showshowaccess tocredit facilitates theprocess
of skill upgrading. Third, ﬁnancial institutions stimulate economic development
by monitoring managers and ensuring that eﬀective corporate governance
mechanisms are in place (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss 1983 and Myers and Majluf
1984). This is expected to induce managers to maximise ﬁrm value rather than
engage in rent-seeking transactions at the expense of shareholders. Fourth, debts
diminish the amount of free cash ﬂow to managers, giving them the incentive to
reducemanagerial slackandseek innovativeways toboost eﬃciency (e.g.Aghion
et al. 1999).Finally, awell-oiledﬁnancial systemameliorates growthprospects by
allowing individual agents to diversify and increase their propensity to undertake
high return but risky projects. This idea is explored theoretically from diﬀerent
perspectives by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) and King and Levine (1993),
amongst others. In light of the well-established proposition that ﬁrms which are
more eﬃcient, fast growing, invest in technology and skill upgradinghave greater
likelihood to export (e.g. Bernard et al. 2003, Clerides et al. 1998 and Aw et al.
1999), it canreasonablybehypothesised thataccess toﬁnancemayenhanceﬁrms’
propensity to export as long as it is growth-enhancing.
3.2. FDI and Export Spillovers
The mechanisms through which intra-industry spillovers from FDI occur are
well-understood in the literature (see Go¨rg and Greenaway 2004, for a recent
8. Beck (2002) and Svalerdy and Vlachos (2005) oﬀer empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis
that ﬁnance inﬂuences the pattern of international trade.
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review).The entry ofmultinational ﬁrms can impactondomestic ﬁrms’ output,
employment and eﬃciency through enhanced competition, technology diﬀu-
sion, export market access and employee training. In particular, FDI may
stimulate the exports of domestic enterprises by providing information on
international markets and marketing strategies or by enhancing the competi-
tiveness of indigenous ﬁrms and by demonstrating new management techni-
ques (Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison 1997).
The early literature has focused on intra-industry FDI spillovers, but
Rodrı´guez-Clare (1996) provides the ﬁrst theoretical analysis of inter-industry
linkage eﬀects generated by multinationals. In a related paper, Markusen and
Venables (1999) oﬀer amodel inwhich the entry ofmultinational ﬁrms has two
contrasting eﬀects on the domestic economy: FDI crowds out domestic
producers of ﬁnal goods via a competition eﬀect, but at the same time creates
favourable conditions to indigenous ﬁrms via linkage eﬀects by, for example,
increasing the demand of intermediate goods. It is worth noting, however, that
neither Rodrı´guez-Clare (1996) nor Markusen and Venables (1999) have
explored explicitly the export-FDI nexus.
IV. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
This section describes the empirical approach employed to identify the
relationship between FDI, access to ﬁnance and exporting intensity, deﬁned
as the share of exports in total sales.Aﬁrm(indexedby i) either exports at time t
with positive exporting intensity or it does not.We formulate a Tobitmodel of
exporting intensity in terms of a latent variable model as:
Exportijt ¼max½0; g1Xijt þ g2FDIijt þ g3Bankijt þ g4ðFDIijt  BankijtÞ
þ g5Dijt þ eijt; e  Nð0; s2Þ
ð1Þ
whereFDI is a vector of indices of foreignpresence9 in industry j at time t;Bank
denotes bank loans normalised by total assets and X is a vector of ﬁrm level
characteristics comprising of new product innovation, age, total factor
productivity growth10, labour training expenditure (normalised by total wage
bills), size and self-raised ﬁnance normalised by total assets. The choice of these
control variables is guided by theoretical considerations and existing empirical
evidence (e.g.Bernard and Jensen2004,Clerides et al. 1998andAwet al. 1999).
9. The construction and deﬁnition of the variables used the FDI indices will be discussed inmore detail
in the next section.
10. Total factor productivity (FP) is calculated using the methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
which accounts for the endogeneity of inputs in the production function estimation.
42 r 2007 The Authors. Journal Compilationr 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
JUN DU/SOURAFEL GIRMA
FinallyD is the full set of industry, time and region dummies and e is a random
error term.
Arguably a number of regressors in Equation (1) such as horizontal FDI,
ﬁrm size, productivity growth, labour training expenditure and bank loans are
potentially endogenous. Foreign ﬁrms are likely to invest in sectors where
domestic ﬁrms have higher a propensity to export. Also, exporting ﬁrms may
have some unobserved characteristics which are systematically correlatedwith
their ability to raise ﬁnance. These considerations motivate us to use an
instrumental variables approach for Tobit models which is due to Smith and
Blundell (1986)11.
Lagged values of the endogenous regressors are used as instruments, but we
also use three additional external instruments. The ﬁrst is a dummy variable
indicating the political/bureaucratic aﬃliation of the ﬁrm. A signiﬁcant
proportion of Chinese privately owned ﬁrms is aﬃliated to some level of
government (such as central and local government) for so-called ‘supervisory’
purposes. This type of bureaucratic aﬃliation can help ﬁrms obtain credit
guarantees (Huang 2004). As such this variable is likely to be a relevant
instrument for the ﬁnance variable12. The remaining two additional variables
are designed to instrument both FDI and access to ﬁnance, and these are
the output share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the proportion of
loss making SOEs in the ﬁrms’ sector and region. These variables aﬀect the
extent of bank access by private ﬁrms, given the lending bias in favour of
SOEs, particularly poorly performing ones. Moreover, Huang (2003) argues
convincingly that a sizeable proportion of recent FDI (especially joint
ventures and acquisitions) in China has resulted from the insolvency
problems facing SOEs. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that the output share
of SOEs and the proportion of loss making SOEs are also sensible instruments
for FDI.
The estimation of Tobit models with endogenous regressors involves two
steps: (i) running a linear regression of each endogenous regressor on the
instrumental variables and all other exogenous regressors, and (ii) estimating
the Tobit model by including the residual terms from step (i) in the list of
covariates. The residuals are correction terms for the endogeneity problem,
and jointly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on these terms can be taken as evidence
in favour of the hypothesis that the relevant regressors are indeed
endogenous.
11. Also see Wooldridge (2001). Newey (1987) suggests a maximum likelihood estimator for discrete
models with endogenous regressors. But his estimator fails to converge within our model – a
commonly encountered problem when there is more than one endogenous regressor.
12. An exploratory analysis suggests the importance of political aﬃliation for access. However,
we leave a more systematic examination of the political economy of access to ﬁnance in China for
future work.
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V. DATABASE DESCRIPTION AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis draws on the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise
Statistics compiled by theState StatisticalBureau ofChina13, covering all ﬁrms
with an annual turnover for over ﬁve million Renminbi (about $60000). It is
estimated that these ﬁrms account for more than 85% of industrial output in
China. The report is a rich source of ﬁrm level characteristics such as ﬁrm
ownership structure, industry aﬃliation, geographic location, establishment
year, employment, gross output, value added, andproduct innovation, sources
of ﬁnance, exports, and employee training expenditure14. The data available to
us cover the period 1999 to 2002.
To capture the extent of foreign presence in each industry-region j at time t,
we deﬁne the degree of horizontal FDI, say HFDIjt, as the proportion of
industry-region output accounted for by multinational companies (MNEs)15.
This and all other indices of FDI are constructed for 171 three-digit industries
within each of the 31 provinces of China. As a result, the FDI variables used in
this study show very good sample variability.
Based on HFDIjt we calculate two indices of foreign presence in backward
and forward linked industries in line with existing practice (cf. Smarzynska-
Javorcik 2004). Backward linkagewith FDI in industry j at time t is a proxy for
the foreign presence in the industries supplied by industry j at time t, and is
computed as:
DFDIjt ¼
X
8k 6¼j
akjHFDIkt ð2Þ
where akj is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to industry k
16. It is
assumed that the greater the proportion of output supplied to an industry with
foreign multinational presence, the greater the degree of linkage between
foreign and local ﬁrms. We refer to this as downstream FDI.
The index of FDI in upstream sectors is calculated in a similar fashion as:
UFDIjt ¼
X
8k6¼j
bkjHFDIkt ð3Þ
13. Various sub-samplesof thisdatabasearenowbeingused in theeconomic literature.See, forexample,
Hu et al. (2005).
14. Nominal values are deﬂated using industry-speciﬁc ex-factory price indices obtained from China
Statistical Yearbook.
15. Horizontal FDI can also be deﬁned as foreign equity participation weighted by output share and
averaged over all ﬁrm in the sector (Smarzynska-Javorcik 2004), or weighted by employment share
instead (Aitken andHarrison 1999). The diﬀerentmeasures of horizontal FDIare found to be highly
correlated, however.
16. This information is obtained from the 1997 input-output table of China.
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where bkj represents the proportion of sector k’s output supplied to industry j.
This measure of FDI, which we label upstream FDI, captures the extent of
forward linkages local ﬁrms in downstream sectors have with MNEs in
supplying sectors.
Each of the three FDI indices (viz. HFDI, DFDI and UFDI) is further
distinguished by the market orientation of the foreign investment (domestic
market seeking versus export-oriented), based on the domestic market sales
and export values reported by multinational enterprises.
Table 1 gives the average output share and exporting intensity of privately
owned and foreign-owned ﬁrms in the database for 1999 and 2002. It is
apparent that foreign-owned ﬁrms (deﬁned as those with at least 25% share of
foreign capital) have signiﬁcant presence in both labour-intensive and capital-
intensive industries. But it is also clear from Table 1 that foreign-owned ﬁrms
have substantial interest in serving domestic markets too. It is worth noting
that, while the output share of private ﬁrms has more than doubled between
1999 and 2002, their average exporting intensity did not exhibit a signiﬁcant
change. Finally, the ﬁgures inTable 1 conﬁrm the well-established proposition
that the geographic distribution of international commerce activity in China is
highly uneven.
The econometric analysis is based on some 28,400 privately owned enter-
prises that have not received any funds from either foreign channels or state
budgets during the sample period. Thus their main sources of ﬁnance are bank
Table 1
Output Share and Export Intensity of PRIVATE and Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIE) by
Industry and Region
PRIVATE ﬁrms FIE enterprises
Output
share
Export
intensity
Output
share
Export
intensity
1999 2002 1999 2002 1999 2002 1999 2002
Industry
Capital intensive 0.037 0.114 0.129 0.149 0.298 0.308 0.439 0.44
Labour intensive 0.044 0.123 0.135 0.148 0.311 0.336 0.434 0.44
Region
Coastal 0.042 0.123 0.184 0.185 0.397 0.407 0.472 0.472
Central 0.038 0.111 0.039 0.064 0.11 0.134 0.185 0.213
Western 0.042 0.105 0.029 0.026 0.088 0.089 0.141 0.146
Notes:
1. Authors’ calculations based on the database used in this paper.
2. The following industry are deﬁned as capital intensive: Chemical, electronics, machinery,
instruments, automobile, pharmaceutical, petroleum and ﬁbre. A more detailed description is
available from the authors upon request.
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loans and self-raised ﬁnance. Table 2 provides some summary statistics for the
variables used in the analysis. About a ﬁfth of the ﬁrms have some exporting
experience, and this does not vary much between labour- and capital-intensive
sectors. It is also interesting to note that the average exporting intensity
amongst exporters is quite high.
As might be expected, ﬁrms in capital-intensive sectors devote more
resources to the training and skill upgrading of their employees, while ﬁrms
in labour-intensive sectors employ, on average, 9%moreworkers than capital-
intensive ones. The ﬁrms in our dataset have registered an impressive average
TFP growth of more than 10%, consistent with the notion that private
enterprises are the main drivers of China’s recent economic growth (e.g. Allen
et al. 2005). Average bank loan normalised by total assets is more than 50%,
indicating theappetite private entrepreneurs inChinahave forbankcredit. The
ratio of self-raised ﬁnance to total assets is also quite high.
We now turn to a discussion of the main ﬁndings of the paper.
VI. MAIN FINDINGS ANDDISCUSSION
The instrumental variables model is estimated for the whole sample and for
labour-intensive and capital-intensive sectors separately. We do this for two
reasons: (i) much of the initial concern regarding export-oriented FDI related
Table 2
Summary Statistics of Variables used in the Regressions
All
sectors
Labour-intensive
sectors
Capital-intensive
sectors
Mean Std. dv. Mean Std. dv. Mean Std. dv.
Export dummy 0.2138 0.4100 0.2202 0.4144 0.2042 0.4031
Export intensity (exporters) 0.6574 0.3581 0.6979 0.3436 0.5921 0.3712
Product innovation /total output 0.0190 0.1138 0.0120 0.0910 0.0294 0.1406
Training expenditure/employment 0.0598 0.3189 0.0456 0.2565 0.0810 0.3933
Size (log employment) 4.6273 0.9386 4.6714 0.9497 4.5611 0.9179
Total factor productivity growth 0.1038 0.7663 0.1012 0.7649 0.1078 0.7683
Age 9.2191 7.7256 8.9452 7.4422 9.6290 8.1145
Bank loans/total assets 0.5135 0.2898 0.5020 0.2929 0.5308 0.2841
Self raised ﬁnance/total assets 0.3017 0.3211 0.3126 0.3538 0.2854 0.2639
Horizontal export-oriented FDI 0.1045 0.1468 0.1181 0.1557 0.0842 0.1297
Horizontal market-seeking FDI 0.1434 0.1336 0.1471 0.1315 0.1379 0.1364
Upstream export-oriented FDI 0.0007 0.0086 0.0006 0.0107 0.0007 0.0036
Upstream market-seeking FDI 0.0009 0.0097 0.0009 0.0120 0.0009 0.0046
Downstream export-oriented FDI 0.0008 0.0047 0.0010 0.0055 0.0003 0.0030
Downstream market-seeking FDI 0.0012 0.0094 0.0016 0.0117 0.0004 0.0041
Observations 40910 24526 16384
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to labour-intensive sectors (e.g. Huang 2003), and (ii) the two sectors are likely
to face diﬀerent external ﬁnancing requirements due to their technological
diﬀerences (cf. Rajan and Zingales 1998).
Themarginal eﬀects from the Tobit models are reported inTable 3. The null
hypothesis of exogeneity of regressors is emphatically rejected in all models,
vindicating the use of the instrumental variables estimator. In linewith existing
empirical evidence, ﬁrm size and productivity growth are found to exert
positive and economically signiﬁcant impacts on the propensity to export.
For example, according to the IV Tobitmodel, a 10 percentage points increase
in ﬁrm size is associated with a 3 percentage points increase in exporting
intensity for the average ﬁrm.Product innovation is also found tohave positive
eﬀects on exporting. The exporting impact of product innovation is more
pronounced in capital-intensive sectors, where the deployment of new product
processes is arguably more crucial for competition in international markets.
By contrast, the export market eﬀect of employee training is more important
in labour-intensive industries, suggesting that skill upgrading is particularly
important in traditional industries seeking to engage in international
commerce.
6.1. Access to Finance, FDI and Exports
The estimates indicate that access to formal ﬁnancial channels (i.e. bank loans)
enhances the exporting intensity of private ﬁrms in China. This eﬀect is more
pronounced in labour-intensive industries.By contrast, the exporting impactof
self-raised ﬁnance is insigniﬁcant in capital-intensive industries. Thus it seems
that exports in capital-intensive are highly dependent on access to external
ﬁnancing and cannot be ﬁnanced through internal cash ﬂows alone. This is an
interesting ﬁnding in view of the idea developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998)
that a ﬁrm’s dependence on external ﬁnance is a function of its technological
characteristics.
We ﬁnd that export spillovers from FDI in China exhibit substantial
heterogeneity. Firstly, export-oriented horizontal FDI has a robust export
enhancing eﬀect, consistent with the belief that exporting multinationals
transmit information about the international markets to their local counter-
parts. Secondly, this positive externality from export-oriented FDI is more
marked in labour-intensive industries and for ﬁrms with more access to bank
loans. Thus access to ﬁnance not only has an unconditional impact on
exporting, but also helps domestic ﬁrms take better advantage of the extern-
alities generated by exporting multinationals in their sector. Thirdly, market
seeking horizontal FDI has a deleterious eﬀect on the export market orienta-
tionof domestic ﬁrms.This eﬀect ismore pronounced amongst ﬁrms in labour-
intensive industries with access to bank loans. One interpretation of this result
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Table 3
Access to Bank Loans, Exports and FDI Spillovers
Dependent variable:
Exporting intensity
IV TOBIT
Variables All sectors Labour-intensive Capital-intensive
Product innovation 0.268 0.209 0.231
(0.106) (0.209) (0.139)
Training expenditure 0.144 0.481 0.073
(0.048) (0.086) (0.074)
Size 0.300 0.233 0.361
(0.013) (0.025) (0.022)
Productivity growth 0.086 0.079 0.103
(0.024) (0.026) (0.039)
Age 2 0.005 2 0.000 2 0.010
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Bank loans 0.787 0.956 0.406
(0.110) (0.106) (0.103)
Self-raised ﬁnance 0.162 0.251 2 0.076
(0.075) (0.071) (0.202)
HE FDI 0.818 0.534 0.910
(0.321) (0.235) (0.340)
HE FDIBank loans 0.410 1.386 2 0.087
(0.629) (0.437) (0.616)
HM FDI 2 1.254 2 1.446 2 1.103
(0.277) (0.376) (0.482)
HMFDIBank loans 2 1.614 2 2.193 2 1.072
(0.532) (0.778) (0.895)
UE FDI 1.924 2 11.769 7.238
(7.916) (14.037) (13.496)
UE FDIBank loans 2 5.720 13.061 2 13.777
(15.514) (20.922) (23.228)
UM FDI 2 3.808 6.645 2 5.365
(6.972) (10.510) (8.763)
UM FDIBank loans 3.551 2 12.121 9.981
(13.817) (16.950) (16.826)
DE FDI 2 0.143 5.766 2 20.921
(2.542) (3.965) (16.419)
DE FDIBank loans 16.662 13.977 19.862
(4.927) (7.164) (23.099)
DM FDI 2 4.035 2 2.994 2 23.380
(2.227) (1.830) (10.603)
DMFDIBank loans 4.361 3.059 27.223
(2.774) (2.131) (11.920)
Observations
Number of ﬁrms 40898 24519 16379
Exogeneity test: w(10)
2 ( p-value) 73.18 99.43 171.54
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note 1: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
Note 2: signiﬁcant at 10%; signiﬁcant at 5%; signiﬁcant at 1%.
Note 3: All speciﬁcations include time, regional and industry dummies.
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would be that domestic enterprises in labour-intensive industries need to
borrowmore to invest in protecting their domesticmarket shares frommarket
seeking multinationals. Fourthly, export-oriented FDI in downstream
sectors does not have any sizeable impact on the export of domestic ﬁrms.
This would appear to suggest that exporting multinationals in China do not
substantially source locally – or at least their interaction with their domestic
intermediate input suppliers does not generate signiﬁcant exporting opportu-
nities for the latter.Fifthly,market-seekingFDI indownstreamsectors leads to
a decrease in domestic ﬁrms’ exporting intensity. It seems that indigenous
enterprises supplying intermediate inputs to domestically-oriented multi-
nationals tend to be more domestically-oriented themselves, other things
constant. Finally, we found no signiﬁcant relationship between domestic
exports and FDI in upstream sectors, irrespective of the market orientation
of multinationals.
6.2. Are Private Firms with Political Aﬃliation Diﬀerent?
Many privately owned enterprises in China are aﬃliated to some level of
government administration. Such privately owned ﬁrms with political connec-
tions are colloquially known as ‘red-hat’ ﬁrms (Huang 2004). The function of
the relevant government body is to oﬀer credit guarantees and political
protection, in return for some ‘management fees’ 17.
We conjecture that politically aﬃliated ﬁrms face ‘softer’ budget constraints
since they are likely to be bailed out by the relevant state body should they
default on their loans. An interesting question in this respect is whether
politically unaﬃliated or ‘purely’ private ﬁrms make more eﬃcient use of
external ﬁnance compared to their ‘red-hat’ counterparts. To explore this issue,
we divide the ﬁrms in our sample into ‘purely’ private and ‘red-hat’, and
estimate the exporting intensity equation on each sub-sample. The results are
reported in Table 4 and they indicate that ‘purely’ private ﬁrms utilise bank
loansmore eﬃciently, as far as the growth of export is concerned. Interestingly,
the export-promoting eﬀect of bank loans is insigniﬁcant for ‘red-hat’ ﬁrms in
capital-intensive industries. While it is well documented that the Chinese
ﬁnancial system channels substantial resources towards ineﬃcient state-owned
enterprises (Allen et al. 2005 and Boyreau-Debray andWei 2005), our ﬁnding
provides preliminary evidence that resource misallocation by the banking
sector induced by political bias exists even when the analysis is conﬁned to the
private sector.
17. Of course bureaucratic/political aﬃliationmay also have its downside, as ‘red-hat’ ﬁrms are likely to
encounter some managerial interference from state bureaucrats.
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6.3. Policy Implications
Until the late 1990s, private enterprises in China were allowed only to export
through state-owned trading corporations. Even then, they did not have the
right to retain foreign exchange earnings from their exports in a bank account.
While this type of blatant discrimination no longer prevails, private ﬁrms still
suﬀer fromﬁnancial repression, especially those without political connections.
In emerging nations likeChina, exporting beneﬁts ﬁrms inmanyways.Most
notably, it is a channel of international technology transfer (Kraay 1999),
creates jobs and generates vital foreign exchange, and hence facilitates the
imports of technology. Our ﬁnding that more ﬁnance generally means more
exports, whereas more FDI (especially market-oriented FDI) can mean fewer
export, has an important policy implication. To foster the exports of domestic
ﬁrms, restructuring the ﬁnancial system is a more potent policy option than
relying on FDI spillovers. This is even more relevant as the scope for ensuring
the ﬂow of the ‘right kind’ of FDI which generates export spillovers is now
rather limited, since placing performance requirements on foreign investors is
against the rules of the WTO, which China joined in 2001.
VII. CONCLUSION
Using a rich panel data set comprising more than 28,000 privately owned
enterprises in China, this paper provides a systematic analysis of the relationship
between access to ﬁnance, FDI and the export of domestic ﬁrms. Controlling for
the endogeneityandheterogeneityofﬁnanceandFDI,weﬁnd thataccess tobank
loans is associated with greater export market orientation, especially amongst
politically unaﬃliated ﬁrms in labour-intensive industries. Export-oriented
horizontal FDI is also found to have a robust export enhancing eﬀect, and this
positive externality is larger for ﬁrms which enjoy better access to ﬁnance. By
contrast, domestic market seeking horizontal FDI has a deleterious eﬀect on the
export orientation of indigenous ﬁrms and robust positive export spillovers
through vertical linkages with multinationals are rather rare. These ﬁndings
suggest that rather than rely onFDI to generate export spillovers, the elimination
ofﬁnancialdiscriminationagainstprivateﬁrms isamoreeﬀectivewayofboosting
the exports of indigenous enterprises. The present paper has the important broad
implication that the expansion of exports is an additional reason why China
should undertake the reform of its state-dominated banking system.
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